Friday, 31 July 2009, 20:24
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 24 STATE 080163
EO 12958 DECL: 07/31/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, KPKO, KUNR
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: THE UNITED
REF: STATE 048489
Classified By: MICHAEL OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. The state department asks US diplomats around the world and at UN heaquarters to provide detailed technical information, including passwords and personal encryption keys for communications networks used by UN officials. It also wants to know about potential links between UN organisations and terrorists, and any corruption in the UN. Key passage highlighted in yellow.
2. Read related article
1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on the United Nations (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to the United Nations (paragraph 2).
A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the 2004 NHCD and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on the United Nations. The review produced a comprehensive list of strategic priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on the United Nations. The priorities should also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.
2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:
A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community’s collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC.
B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to : office and
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organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet “handles”, internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.
3. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:
A. Key Near-Term Issues 1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1) 2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1) 3) Somalia (FPOL-1) 4) Iran (FPOL-1) 5) North Korea (FPOL-1)
B. Key Continuing Issues 1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1) 2) Iraq (FPOL-1) 3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1) 4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3) 5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response (HREL-3) 6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDN-5H) 7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H) 8) Burma (FPOL-1)
C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations 1) Africa (FPOL-1) 2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1) 3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1)
D. UN Security Council 1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1) 2) Sanctions (FPOL-1)
E. UN Management 1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1) 2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1)
F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1)
G. Other Substantive Issues 1) Food Security (FOOD-3) 2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4) 3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H) 4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4) 5) Health Issues (HLTH-4) 6) Terrorism (TERR-5H) 7) Trafficking, Social, and Women’s Issues (DEPS-5H)
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H. Intelligence and Security Topics 1) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 2) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1) 4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)
15. Collection requirements and tasking
(Agriculture is the Department of Agriculture; Commerce is the Department of Commerce; DHS is the Department of Homeland Security; DIA/DH is Defense Intelligence Agency/Defense HUMINT; Energy is the Department of Energy; DNI/OSC is the Open Source Center of the Director of National Intelligence; FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation; HHS is the Department of Health and Human Services; Navy is the Navy HUMINT element; NCS/CS is the CIA’s Clandestine Service; OSC/MSC is the Map Services Center of OSC; State is the Department of State; TAREX (Target Exploitation) collects information using HUMINT Methods in support of NSA’s requirements; Treasury is the Department of Treasury; USAID is the U.S. Agency for International Development; USSS is the U.S. Secret Service; USTR is the U.S. Trade Representative; WINPAC is the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center.)
A. Key Near-Term Issues
1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1). — Views of United Nations (UN) member states on contributing troops and air transportation equipment, such as helicopters, to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the African Union (AU)-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). — Details of deployments of troop contributor countries to UNMIS/UNAMID. — Details on actions and views of UN personnel deployed in UNMIS/UNAMID. — Views of UNSC members on the success or failure of UNMIS/UNAMID. — Operational plans of UNMIS/UNAMID from both the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, and UNMIS/UNAMID in Sudan. — Details of diplomatic engagement between UNMIS/UNAMID Special Envoys for the Darfur Peace Process in Sudan, and the Sudanese government or Darfur rebel groups. — Views of member states on UN activities in Sudan (including Darfur). — Divisions between UN member and UN Secretariat assessments of the situation on the ground as it affects UN action.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda,
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Vietnam International Organizations: AU, European Union (EU), UN
2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1). — Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states regarding the ongoing operations of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), including force protection in Afghanistan. — Information on plans and intentions of UN leadership or member states affecting elections in Afghanistan. — Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian assistance. — Plans and intentions of key member states and Secretariat leadership concerning Afghan political and economic reconstruction, including efforts to combat warlords and drug trafficking. — Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian intentions or reluctance to secure and safeguard UN and nongovernmental organization (NGO) personnel (international as well as locally-hired staff).
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Iran, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: Taliban International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Somalia (FPOL-1). — UN plans and potential to expand, reinforce, or replace the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). — Plans and intentions of UN leadership, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and member states to deploy a UN-led maritime force to monitor piracy off the coast of Somalia. — Willingness of member states to pledge troops or air transport to a possible UN or multinational force in Somalia. — Views of Somali population on the deployment of a UN or multinational peacekeeping force in Somalia. — Details of diplomatic engagement between UN envoys and Somali government or Somali opposition officials. — Information on World Food Program activities in Somalia. — Details of UN Development Program (UNDP)-Somalia training Transitional Federal Government police officers and Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia officials in the Joint Security Force.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, NATO, UN
4) Iran (FPOL-1). — Plans and intentions of the UN Secretary General (SYG),
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Secretariat staff, or member states to address efforts by Iran to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear weapons. — Positions and responses of member states to future International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Director General reports on Iran,s Implementation of Safeguards and relevant provisions of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. — Specific plans and activities of the UK, France, Germany (EU-3), and Russia with respect to IAEA policy toward Iran. — Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states, especially Russia and China, regarding human rights in Iran, sanctions on Iran, Iran,s arming of HAMAS and Hizballah, and Iran,s candidacy for UN leadership positions. — Plans and intentions of Perm 5, other key member states, coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials concerning sanctions against Iran. — Member support/opposition/subversion of US positions regarding Iranian sanctions. — Iranian diplomatic efforts with the IAEA and UN member states to avoid passage of additional sanctions and effective implementation of existing sanctions, as well as its efforts to end UNSC involvement in Iran’s nuclear program by returning Iran’s nuclear file to the IAEA. — Information on Iran,s activities as chair of the UNDP and within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). — Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in Iran; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with Iranian officials.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese) International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN Non-State Entities: West Bank and Gaza Strip
5) North Korea (FPOL-1). — Plans and intentions of UNSC members, especially the P-5, to consider additional resolutions against North Korea and/or sanctions under existing resolutions. — Information on the plans and actions of UNSC members to address efforts by North Korea to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear weapons. — UN views on food aid to North Korea, designating it as a nation in famine, and misuse of aid. — North Korean delegation views and activities; instructions/plans of delegation officials on North Korean WMD-related issues. — Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in North Korea. — Details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with North Korean officials. — Biographic and biometric information on ranking North Korean diplomats.
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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN
B. Key Continuing Issues
1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1). — Positions, attitudes, and divisions among member states on UN Security Council (UNSC) reform. — Views, plans and intentions of Perm 5 and other member states on the issue of UNSC enlargement, revision of UNSC procedures or limitation of Perm 5 privileges. — International deliberations regarding UNSC expansion among key groups of countries: self-appointed frontrunners for permanent UNSC membership Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (the Group of Four or G-4); the Uniting for Consensus group (especially Mexico, Italy, and Pakistan) that opposes additional permanent UNSC seats; the African Group; and the EU, as well as key UN officials within the Secretariat and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Presidency. — Willingness of member states to implement proposed reforms. — Reactions of UN senior leadership towards member recommendations for UNSC reform.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
2) Iraq (FPOL-1). — Plans and intentions of the Perm 5, other key member states, coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials concerning Iraqi political and economic reconstruction, the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), and internal Iraqi boundaries. — Plans and intentions of the International Organization for Migration to assist with the reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees. — Extent to which member states will support or subvert US positions regarding Iraqi objectives, including reconstruction efforts. — Information on plans and intentions of the SYG, Secretariat staff, or member states affecting elections in Iraq. — Iraqi actions to convert UNAMI to a Chapter 6 mission. — Iraqi attitudes toward the UN. — Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian assistance.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
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Terrorist Groups: Insurgents in Iraq, Iraqi Shia Militants International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1). — Details on views, plans and intentions of key Secretariat decision-makers, member states and influential blocs and coalitions on UN engagement and role in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), including implementation of the roadmap. — Indications that a UNGA special session on the Middle East might be reconvened. — Developments within the UN system that would further the Arab-Israeli peace process. — Details about Quartet (EU, UN, US, and Russia) MEPP plans and efforts, including private objectives behind proposals and envoy negotiating strategies. — Strategy and plans of SYG special envoy regarding US positions, Quartet plans, and other (EU, Russia, UK) special envoys. — Indications member states or donor countries might scale back UN peacekeeping presence in or aid donations to the Middle East. — Plans of the SYG or member states to pressure the US on the MEPP. — Views, plans and tactics of the Palestinian Authority, including its representative to the UN, to gain support in the UNSC, UNGA, or UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for its strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues, including from Russia and EU countries, especially France, Germany, and UK. — Views of Secretary General,s Special Envoy and UNSC on possible settlement of the Shab’a Farms dispute to include Syria/Lebanon border demarcation. — Secretariat views regarding water management as part of the Middle East Peace Process, including domestic and regional competition for allocation. — Quartet views on Syria’s policies and approach toward Israel and Palestinians and on Syrian motives behind and efforts to subvert or support Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. — UN efforts to influence negotiating positions on territorial boundaries, water resources and management, and right of return. — Views, plans and tactics of HAMAS to gain support in the UNSC or UNGA for its strategies and positions on HAMAS-Israeli issues, and on HAMAS-Palestinian Authority issues, including from Russia, China, Iran, and EU countries, especially France, Germany, and the UK. — Information on UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) activities in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank, and its relations with HAMAS/Hizballah. — Plans and intentions of member states to support/oppose US priority to reduce the number of Middle East resolutions.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
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Croatia, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Spain, Syria, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese) International Organizations: EU, UN Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and Gaza Strip
4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3). — Plans and policies of UN leaders, member states, and foreign NGOs to promote human rights. — Plans and intentions of member states toward the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and other UN-related courts and tribunals dealing with human rights issues. — Plans and intentions of UNHRC members to support or oppose US policies in the UNHRC. — Views of UNSC and other member states on Zimbabwe,s government policies on human rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy, and candidacy for any UN leadership positions. — Views and intentions of UNSC, UN human rights entities, and members regarding Sri Lankan government policies on human rights and humanitarian assistance; UN views about appointing a Special Envoy for Sri Lanka. — Plans and perceptions of member states toward establishment of new measures to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other systematic human rights abuses. — Plans and intentions of member states toward proposals and resolutions supported by the US or like-minded states, including those advancing democracy; women’s rights, particularly implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820; those pertaining to children in armed conflict; or those condemning human rights abuses in individual countries. — Information on reactions of member states to resolutions designed to promote democracy, human rights and reforms in the Muslim world. — Perceived success or failure of abilities and priorities of the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), and efforts by member states to undermine OHCHR independence. — Views, intentions and tactics of UNHRC members regarding reform and the role of the US. — Member state support for/opposition to objectives of human rights, refugee, development, and emergency relief agencies. — Plans and intentions of member states or UN Special Rapporteurs to press for resolutions or investigations into US counterterrorism strategies and treatment of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan or Guantanamo. — Degree of coordination by and among human rights agencies, especially between the UN Human Rights Council, the OHCHR,
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the UNGA Third Committee, the UN Economic and Social Council, and the International Labor Organization. — Plans and agenda for upcoming UNGA Third Committee and UNHRC sessions and world human rights conferences, particularly plans by developing countries to stymie criticism of their human rights records through procedural motions or influencing votes. — Plans of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to sponsor resolutions or conventions in the UN restricting freedom of speech under the rubric of criminalizing “defamation of religion.” — Details of UNHRC and OHCHR budget shortfalls.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Chad, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Georgia, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: AU, EU, Human Rights Entities and War Crimes Courts, ICC, OIC, UN
5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response (HREL-3). — Information on the planning and execution of responses to humanitarian emergencies by UN member states and Secretariat; indications US assistance may be requested. — Efforts of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Food Program (WFP), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), and other UN entities to respond to and to coordinate activities in humanitarian or refugee crises, including environmental disasters. — Views of UN Secretariat, UNSC members, and key member states on UNRWA. — Details on effectiveness of UNHCR and OCHA leadership. — Information on ability of UN to gain/not gain humanitarian access to troubled areas, especially in light of security concerns. — Location of humanitarian facilities, including GPS coordinates, and number of personnel. — Details of friction between UNHCR, OCHA and UN Security Coordinator Headquarters and field offices. — Level of cooperation and coordination or lack thereof between UN aid agencies and non-UN aid programs. — Interoperability and willingness to work with US coalitions in humanitarian assistance operations; willingness to provide support despite security threats. — Indications of donor fatigue. — Status of and member support for/opposition to efforts by UNHCR to refocus organization’s work and to redistribute programs to other agencies. — Details on UNHCR funding shortfalls. — Perceived ability of the UNDP to coordinate an effective UN presence in each country and to promote democratic
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governance. — Plans and ability to care for and protect internally displaced persons. — Communications and logistics problems.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: Economic-Societal Entities, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN, World Health Organization
6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDN-5H). — Plans and intentions of member states to address threats to international security from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. — Views of member states on tactical and substantive aspects of resolutions pertaining to missile proliferation, missile defense, nuclear disarmament, the IAEA, and Israel’s nuclear program. — Information from key Secretariat decision-makers, key IAEA Secretariat staff, member states, or influential blocs or groups, such as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the OIC, or the Group of 77 (G-77), on the role of the UN on nuclear proliferation or addressing the expansion of capabilities to produce or use weapons of mass destruction.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms Control Organizations, OIC, UN
7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H). — Plans and intentions of Secretariat and member states to respond to individuals affiliated with terrorist groups or state sponsors of terrorism threatening the safety or security of domestic and overseas UN personnel, facilities, protectees, or installations. — Evidence of relationship or funding between UN personnel and/or missions and terrorist organizations. — Debate in Secretariat, UNSC counterterrorism bodies (subcommittees), UN agencies and among member states about measures for funding of security for UN domestic and overseas facilities, operations, and personnel. — Host-country intentions to secure and safeguard UN and NGO personnel. — Reactions to and assessments of terrorist acts directed at the UN, UN personnel, UN protectees, or domestic and overseas UN installations, including foreign UN missions in New York. — Details of UN efforts to acquire, collect, assess and disseminate threat information within the US and overseas. — Plans of UN security offices to upgrade security at UN
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domestic and overseas UN facilities.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
8) Burma (FPOL-1). — Views of UNSC and member states on Burma,s policies and actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy, and attempts to play a larger UN role. — Plans and intentions of the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General on Burma regarding future interaction with Burma and engagement with UN member states. — Plans and intentions of the SYG on Burma; level of trust in his Special Adviser. — Views of Burmese officials on the SYG, on his Special Adviser on Burma, and on key countries in the UN. — Role of the UN in Burmese elections. — Development and democratization activities of UNDP in Burma; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with Burmese officials.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN
C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations.
1) Africa (FPOL-1). — Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states regarding peace operations, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Chad/Central African Republic, Burundi, Cote d,Ivoire, and Liberia. — UN peacekeeping plans and intentions regarding military operations against rebels based in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. — Early warning information available to the Secretariat on potential threats to peace and security. — UN views on the role of AFRICOM in African conflict resolution and post-conflict capacity building. — UN expectations of US military involvement in African peacekeeping missions and how this may influence UN willingness to establish, curb, or end missions. — Extent to which UN peace operations in Africa are straining the resources of the UN and member states; impact of current operations on future operations and readiness. — UN views on peacekeeping mission creep and pressures to expand the UN role in African conflict zones, either in the form of more comprehensive “peacemaking” mission mandates or in areas where security threats demand more aggressive and timely UN-led multilateral intervention. — Details on views of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
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Operations on operational plans, including the ability of the UN and its member states to build capacity in Africa, including by working with the AU or other regional organizations and NGOs. — Efforts by China, France, Iran, and others to gain influence in Africa via UN peace operations. — Information on extent of support and capabilities for peace operations by the AU and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). — Official stance on deploying HIV positive troops and actual practice. — Degree to which official peacekeeping reporting matches unofficial communications of events; views on those discrepancies. — Views of African states that host peacekeepers regarding UN peacekeeping troops and troop contributing countries. — Attitudes and intentions of Ghana and Rwanda concerning UN peace operations in Africa and perception of their relative ability to contribute to such efforts. — Attitudes of other African States to Ghana/Rwanda participation and leadership.
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cote d,Ivoire, Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN Non-State Entities: Lord,s Resistance Army
2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1). — Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states regarding ongoing peace operations outside Africa. — Willingness of UN leaders and member states to support UN peacekeeping efforts and utilize preventive diplomacy in areas of potential conflict. — Views of member states on and plans to respond to the US-backed G-8 plan to expand global peace operations capabilities. — Views and positions of key member states and Secretariat toward proposed resolutions, mandates, peacekeeping issues, and US-sponsored initiatives. — Information on whether member states will utilize references to the ICC to condition support for peace operations. — Information on deployment benchmarks, pre-deployment screening, and supply and logistic shortfalls in peace operations. — Ability to obtain pledges and deploy capable military forces, including surge capabilities. — Views of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member states on Haiti,s government policies and actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, and democracy.
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— Views and positions of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member states regarding the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and peacekeeping in Lebanon.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN
3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1). — UN member views, plans, and intentions concerning the capability of the UN to organize, lead, and carry out new, complex military operations and civilian police operations. — Information on Secretariat or member views on or initiatives for peace operations reform. — Information on the appointment of SYG special representatives for new peace or political operations. — Scope, objectives, command structures, rules of engagement, and threat environment for proposed peacekeeping activities, including transportation and communications infrastructures and any available maps. — Types, number, and capabilities of troops, equipment, and materiel that countries are willing to contribute. — Information on interoperability of equipment and material available for logistic support. — Information on turf battles between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, and Department of Political Affairs over control of peace operations. — Information on turf battles between logistic and military sides of peace operations. — UN member views on reform of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. — Information on troop contributing countries’ tendency to follow orders given by troop contributing country commanders vice UN field commanders. — Influence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) on including human rights and refugee concerns within peace operations mandates. — Host government views and concerns about UN policies toward that country. — Influence of UN security coordinator on operational planning; field personnel reaction to UN security directives. — Capability/plans for Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) deployments. — Details on peacekeeper abuse of women and children; national and UN responses. — Changes in ability of member states, especially member states of EU, AU and ECOWAS, to contribute troops to peace operations, including for economic, social, and operational reasons. — Details on contributions of member states (in kind,
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personnel, or financial).
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
D. UN Security Council
1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1). — Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC members and Secretariat on issues that come before the UNSC, especially voting intentions of UNSC members and priorities or frictions among the Perm 5. — Plans and intentions of UNSC members to support or oppose US policies in the UNSC. — Specific views and positions of key member states on US-sponsored initiatives, initiatives with implications for the US, and other proposed resolutions and mandates. — Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially those that do not include the US (particularly the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, the OIC, and the Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC). — Differences in the positions of member states, differences between UN missions and their capitals, internal procedures for determining voting instructions, and voting instructions to delegations. — Priorities, plans, and intentions of new member states joining the UNSC, and influences on them by regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially those that do not include the US (particularly AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, and the OIC). — Plans and intentions of member states of regional groups regarding UNSC candidacy. — Biographic and biometric information on UNSC Permanent Representatives, information on their relationships with their capitals.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
2) Sanctions (FPOL-1). — UNSC member plans, intentions, and views toward sanctions issues, especially during negotiations of sanctions resolutions. — Willingness of and efforts by UN member states to violate sanctions. — Perceived and actual impact of sanctions on target
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governments, individuals, entities, as well as on civil population. — Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee members. — Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee expert groups and their ability to support sanctions monitoring. — Pressure to limit scope and length of new sanctions, especially from coalitions and regional groups. — Views and actions of the Secretariat or member states with regard to sanctions, including to bolster UN ability to support sanctions implementation and to address violations. — Views of target government on sanctions imposed on it.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN
E. UN Management
1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1). — SYG’s management and decision-making style, and his influence on the Secretariat. — Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for UN management. — Role and influence of Secretariat and other key officials with SYG and other UN system agencies. — Views of and brokering by key officials on major issues. — Changes in and appointment and selection process for key officials of Secretariat, specialized agency, committee, commission, and program officials in New York, Geneva, Vienna, and other UN system cities, to include special assistants and chiefs of staff. — Personalities, biographic and biometric information, roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key UN officials, to include under secretaries, heads of specialized agencies and their chief advisers, top SYG aides, heads of peace operations and political field missions, including force commanders. — Relations between key UN officials and member states. — Views of member states on the next SYG race, to include preferred candidates and candidates lacking UN member support. — Views of UNSC members and other member states on Cuban, Iranian, or Syrian candidacy for any UN leadership positions.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1). — Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and
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subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for UN management. — Perceptions of member states of the effectiveness of the Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) to combat waste, fraud, mismanagement, and corruption. — Effectiveness of the OIOS, in light of the review of the OIOS mandate. — Plans and moves to implement OIOS recommendations. — SYG’s view of the role of the OIOS. — Secretariat attitudes toward and evidence of corruption in UN agencies and programs, and willingness to implement measures to reduce corruption. — Plans and intentions of UN member states or the Secretariat to address corruption issues at the UN and UN agencies. — Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members to push for or block management reform proposals. — Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members or senior UNDP managers to address potential or actual cases of corruption or mismanagement by field missions, including efforts to cover up waste, fraud, or abuse. — Internal complaints by UNDP staff about waste, fraud, or abuse and efforts by UNDP management to respond to them. — Plans and intentions of Board members, such as Iran, to push for increased UNDP funding for programs in their own countries or those of their friends. — Degree of independence from UN headquarters of UNDP Resident Coordinators in the field and perceptions of field staff on UN aid consolidation reforms under the “One UN” Program. — Efforts by the G-77 Board members to develop common group platforms, especially on budget and management reform issues. — Developments in the implementation of the performance based personnel system and contractor reform. — Plans, intentions, and agendas of UN specialized agency executive committees. — Impact and effectiveness of whistle-blowing provisions on the UN reform process. — Attitudes of UN staff and member states towards extending a common whistle-blower protection program to all UN funds and programs. — Indications of pressure by member states or groups to increase or control growth in the budget. — Secretariat and member attitudes towards changes in the scale of assessments. — Options under consideration to resolve financial problems. — SYG views on and plans for responding to Government Accountability Office reports calling on the UN to more effectively implement results-based budgeting, and make further progress on management reform. — Secretariat and member attitudes and plans to improve the UN budget process. — Status and use of advanced information systems to
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streamline UN processes.
Countries: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1). — Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the General Assembly, especially those that do not include the US, i.e., the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, the OIC, and the GRULAC. — Details of bargaining on votes or candidacies and attempts to marginalize or undermine proposed or planned US positions or policy initiatives. — Information on the EU agenda in the UNGA, especially as it relates to US priorities in the First, Third, and Fifth Committees. — Information on efforts by the EU or other member states to secure additional voting rights in the UN and its specialized agencies. — Lobbying by member states for committee membership assignments or vice presidencies. — Information on current and likely future leadership of regional groups, blocs, and coalitions. — Differences over positions between UN missions and their respective capitals. — Voting instructions to delegations on key resolutions. — Plans, intentions, and agendas of key committee chairs; member views of issues that come before these committees. — Efforts of Third World countries to moderate, via NAM and G-77, Third World positions on development, defamation of religion, or human rights issues. — Intentions of UN members to use non-UN bodies and working groups to bypass perceived UN bureaucracy. — Perceptions of member states of the viability and potential impact of the US-backed Democracy Caucus. — Biographical and biometric information on key NAM/G-77/OIC Permanent Representatives, particularly China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Senegal, and Syria; information on their relationships with their capitals.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
G. Other Substantive Issues
1) Food Security (FOOD-3). — Status and proposals related to the UN Comprehensive
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Framework for Action to address the global food crisis. — WFP activities and proposals related to reforming donor food aid policies and establishing a new standing global fund to address regularly occurring food crises. — WFP and FAO plans and proposals regarding the impact on food prices and food security of the growing use of ethanol and biofuels. — Internal UN responses to international calls for reform of FAO and WFP.
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: FAO, UN, World Animal Health Organization Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and Gaza Strip
2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4). — Country preparations for the December 2009 Copenhagen UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Meeting. — Developments related to other UNFCCC meetings and discussions on a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. — Perceptions of key negotiators on US positions in environmental negotiations. — Developments on the Montreal Protocol, including reactions to US efforts to limit hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). — Indications that member states working through the UN and its specialized agencies are/are not fostering environmental cooperation, partnerships and capacity building between and among member states and regional and sub-regional organizations. — Monitoring of and compliance with UN-sponsored environmental treaties; evidence of treaty circumvention. — Information on adherence to member states’ own national environmental programs, including protection, monitoring, and cleanup efforts. — Efforts by treaty secretariats to influence treaty negotiations or compliance. — Information on the Convention on Biological Diversity, particularly on access, benefit sharing and bio-safety. — Information on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including potential efforts to modify or amend its provisions. — Information on excessive maritime claims, including those relating to ridges. — Information on efforts to develop a mechanism to add chemicals to the list of persistent organic pollutants. — Information and perceptions on the strategic approach to international chemicals management, especially efforts of the EU’s management program. — Information on participation in and compliance with the UN Basel Convention. — Status of efforts to set standards to promote
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environmental protection, including protection of forests, desertification, and invasive or endangered species. — Efforts within the UN to protect water resources, and to promote development of alternative sources of energy.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN
3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H). — Information on efforts by UN member states or organizations to promote or obstruct regulatory reform, including banking and financial reforms, transparency, international law, trade, development, and foreign direct investment to reflect the Monterrey anti-poverty consensus and the Millennium Development Goals. — Plans, intentions, and tactics of the UNGA President regarding international financial problems; views of member states regarding these plans. — Plans and intentions of member states to support US priorities related to economic freedom and promotion of democracy. — Secretariat or member plans to develop multilateral economic, trade, or development agreements impinging on US interests. — Efforts by member states and the Secretariat to reconcile international differences over globalization, especially the perceived impact of globalization on human rights, labor, and environmental issues. — Member positions on UN decisions, plans, and activities concerning environmentally sustainable economic growth through market economies, free trade, private investment, and efficient multilateral development assistance. — Efforts to expand the global compact involving corporations committed to observing human rights, environmental, and labor standards. — SYG’s views and statements on trade issues and efforts to influence future World Trade Organization rounds. — Plans and intentions of UN member states that may impact freedom of navigation. — Information on international taxation initiatives.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, FAO, International Financial Institutions and Infrastructures, UN, World Bank, World Trade Organization
4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4). — Plans, tactics, timetables, and draft proposals for the Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and especially
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information related to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone initiative, from interested individual member states (especially China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, and South Africa) and like-minded groups such as the NAM and the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden). — Member state views of the major problems facing the NPT; whether or under what conditions states would consider withdrawing from the NPT. — Member views on and responses to US plans and policies on missile defense and positions on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, particularly those of Russia, China, and Pakistan. — Information on IAEA plans for safeguards, international fuel banks, or other nuclear fuel supply arrangements, and meetings of the Board of Governors at the IAEA. — Member views on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); prospects for country ratifications and entry into force. — Member plans for plenary meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; views of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. — Readiness of member states to reform the agenda of the UN General Assembly’s First Committee; proposals prepared by member states for the First Committee. — Views of key delegations on US proposals on land mines. — Tactical and substantive information regarding periodic arms control meetings in New York, Geneva, Vienna and elsewhere, including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process, UN experts group on missiles, and meetings on conventional arms. — Plans and intentions of member states to introduce new arms control or proliferation prevention measures or make significant changes to existing agreements. – Member or Secretariat plans to address WMD proliferation, safeguards, arms control and disarmament, or other threat reduction efforts. — Foreign attitudes on UN-sanctioned arms control negotiations. — Biographic and biometric data on, and positions of key UN arms control interlocutors, especially candidates for the position of Director General of the IAEA, and the heads of other international institutions.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms Control Organizations, NATO, OSCE, UN
5) Health Issues (HLTH-4). — UN, WHO, and other international organizations,
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forecasts, expected impacts, plans, proposals, key studies, and reactions to major health crises and other health-related issues, including efforts on disease eradication, improving health standards and access to care and medicine, and programs to monitor and respond to emerging infectious disease outbreaks and other disasters or emergencies. — Information on deliberations in the UN and other international health organizations on health issues and the policy positions and objectives of member states and key figures, including compromises, insertions, and items omitted in published declarations and studies. — Information on international health organizations, relationships and interactions with countries and other organizations, including relationships with regional offices or subsidiaries. — Details on limits and restrictions placed on international organizations to investigate reports of diseases that pose an international threat, including restrictions placed on the nationality of members of investigation teams. — Details on disease transparency, particularly indications about inconsistent reporting of outbreaks to appropriate international organizations and delivery of specimens to WHO- and FAO-affiliated laboratories, and including discussions or agreements impacting the publicly disclosed occurrence of diseases. — Details of discussions related to the accessibility of HIV/AIDS drugs (antiretroviral drugs or ARVs). — Details related to the availability, accessibility, and regulation of health care, particularly medications, vaccines, and counterfeits. — Member state attitudes toward maintenance of smallpox stocks. — Information on global counterfeit medications to include surveillance, countermeasures, and research and development issues. — Details on efforts to implement health-related Millennium Development Goals. — Details on corruption in international health organizations or the corrupt use of goods and services provided for health issues by bilateral and multilateral donors and international health organizations, including WHO, UNAIDS, FAO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. — Details on irregularities in Global Fund fundraising, spending, and treatment of whistle blowers. — Personalities, biographic and biometric information, roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key health officials, to include the Director General of the WHO, head of UNAIDS, the Pan American Health Organization, under Secretaries, heads of specialized agencies and their chief advisers, and top aides.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
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Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, FAO, UN, World Animal Health Organization, WHO
6) Terrorism (TERR-5H). — Information on plans and intentions of UN bodies and member states to respond to or address within UN fora the worldwide terrorist threat. — Structure, plans and key figures of UN counterterrorism strategy. — Information on plans and activities of UNSC,s four counterterrorism sub-bodies. — Plans and intentions of member states to address terrorism by implementing anti-terrorism legislation as called for under resolutions, particularly as they relate to tracking financial transactions. — Views of member states on US policy toward terrorism. — Efforts of member states to support or oppose activities undertaken by UN specialized agencies such as the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization to improve maritime and airline security. — Information on UN support for technical assistance to member states to combat terrorism, particularly in Africa. — Views of member states about inclusion or exclusion of terrorism against Israel in counterterrorism efforts and definition of terrorism. — (For further requirements, see the NHCD on Terrorism Threats to US Interests at Home and Abroad, July 13, 2005.)
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
7) Trafficking, Social, and Women’s Issues (DEPS-5H). — Plans and intentions of member states to support or oppose US priority to combat trafficking and exploitation of men, women, and children. — Member state perceptions of ability of UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to follow through on strategies to support women and children through UN specialized bodies. — Information on member efforts to combat organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons. — Plans and intentions of member states to address reproductive issues, including the aims of the EU vis-a-vis the US, GRULAC, Arab, and OIC nations. — Member state perceptions or plans regarding efforts to reconcile religious differences worldwide. — Information on reforms undertaken within the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and future plans of the organization. — Member views on education initiatives.
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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
H. Intelligence and Security Topics
1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
2) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1). — Influence of key UN-affiliated foreign NGOs on UN decision-making. — Efforts of foreign NGOs to undermine US policy initiatives. — Foreign NGO role in, views toward, and influence on UN policies and activities on globalization, justice, human rights, the environment, and family/women/children/reproductive issues. — Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to assist refugees, displaced persons, and victims of disasters through the UNHCR and WFP. — Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to support the UN Environmental Program or national efforts with environmental protection, pollution monitoring, and cleanup efforts. — Contacts between foreign NGOs and Secretariat staff that could involve sharing of confidential data. — Foreign efforts to strip US or foreign NGOs of UN affiliation and to block US or foreign NGOs seeking UN affiliation. — Efforts by member states-*particularly China, Cuba, Israel, Russia, and Islamic countries*-to obtain NGO affiliation for organizations supporting their policies. — Efforts by organizations affiliated with terrorist organizations or foreign intelligence organizations to obtain NGO affiliation with the UN. — Efforts by the EU through the Arhus convention to place NGOs on UN bureaus; reactions of member states to those efforts. — Role of NGOs at the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (OHCR), OHCHR, and UNHRC in the Third Committee of the UNGA.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). — Current technical specifications, physical layout, and planned upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure and
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information systems, networks, and technologies used by top officials and their support staffs. — Details on commercial and private VIP networks used for official communications, to include upgrades, security measures, passwords, personal encryption keys, and types of V P N versions used. — Telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of key officials, as well as limited distribution telephone numbers/directories and public switched networks (PSTN) telephone directories; dialing numbers for voice, datalink, video teleconferencing, wireless communications systems, cellular systems, personal communications systems, and wireless facsimiles. — Information on hacking or other security incidents involving UN networks. — Key personnel and functions of UN entity that maintains UN communications and computer networks. — Indications of IO”>IO”>IO/IW operations directed against the UN. — Information about current and future use of communications systems and technologies by officials or organizations, including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones, very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption, international connectivity, use of electronic data interchange, Voice-over-Internet protocol (VoIP), Worldwide interoperability for microwave access (Wi-Max), and cable and fiber networks.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN CLINTON
DE RUEHEG #1349/01 1951144
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141144Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3182
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 001349
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM MASS IR IZ KPAL IS EG
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS’ MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
REF: A. CAIRO 1227
¶B. CAIRO 746
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. Key Points:
— (S/NF) During a June 29 meeting with CENTCOM Commander
General Petraeus, Egyptian General Intelligence Service
(EGIS) Chief Omar Soliman shared his views on Iraq, Iran, and
ongoing efforts on Palestinian reconciliation.
— (S/NF) On Iraq, Soliman assessed that Arab leaders were
taking a “new position” on supporting Iraqi Prime Minister
Maliki following the Iranian elections and described Egypt’s
plans to increase cooperation with the Iraqi government.
— (S/NF) Soliman believed that the Iranian elections and
Hezbollah’s electoral defeat in Lebanon presented a “good
opportunity” to reduce Iranian regional interference,
including by improving Syria’s relations with the Arab world.
— (S/NF) On Palestinian reconciliation, Soliman was
pessimistic that an agreement would be reached, but promised
that Egypt would “not give up” and would continue efforts to
undermine Hamas, including by preventing money and guns from
Iraq: Extending an Arab Hand
¶2. (S/NF) Soliman said Arab countries were looking for ways
to support Prime Minister Maliki during this “crucial time”
for Iraq. General Petraeus thanked Egypt for supporting the
Iraqi government, including by nominating a new Ambassador to
Iraq (ref A) and encouraging other Arab countries to “hold
out a hand in friendship.” On President Mubarak’s
instructions, Soliman explained, Egypt plans to increase
cooperation with Iraq on a wide variety of political,
security, and economic issues.
¶3. (S/NF) Soliman assessed that Arab leaders were taking a
“new position” on Iraq following the Iranian presidential
elections. He believed that Iranian leaders would “change
their attitude” towards neighboring countries and “supporting
terrorism” abroad, and would focus instead on domestic
issues. Iran cannot afford to “challenge the international
community now,” Soliman opined. The challenge, Soliman
explained, was to “bring Iraq back to the Arab world” and
foster support for Maliki. According to Soliman, President
Mubarak told King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia “not to search for
another man,” but should instead accept Maliki as Iraq’s
leader and support him.
Iran: Elections Present Opportunity for Arabs
¶4. (S/NF) Soliman stressed that Egypt suffers from Iranian
interference, through its Hezbollah and Hamas proxies, and
its support for Egyptian groups like Jamaatt al-Islamiyya and
the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt will confront the Iranian
threat, he continued, by closely monitoring Iranian agents in
Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and any Egyptian cells.
Improving relations between Syria and the Arab world would
also undermine Iran’s regional influence. Soliman noted “a
little change” in Syria’s attitude on engaging with the Arab
world, adding that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia shared this
view and planned to visit Damascus soon “to help change
¶5. (S/NF) Soliman anticipated that Hezbollah’s recent defeat
in the Lebanese parliamentary elections would force the group
to “remain quiet for sometime” as they rebuild domestic
support and counter the perception that Hezbollah is a “tool
of outsiders.” With Iran itself focusing on domestic issues,
he continued, it was a “good time to make changes” in Lebanon
and reduce Iran’s influence. Egypt will support a Saad
Hariri government and the Lebanese army, Soliman emphasized.
¶6. (S/NF) Soliman said that Iran heeded Egypt’s warning
against meddling in domestic affairs (ref B) and supporting
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. He received a “very
positive message” from Iran’s intelligence chief indicating
that Iran would not interfere in Egypt. Egypt planned to
“remain quiet inside Iran” for the time being, but would
continue to recruit agents who “will do what we ask,” if Iran
insists on interfering in Egypt. “We hope Iran will stop
CAIRO 00001349 002 OF 003
supporting Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and other cells”
within Egypt Soliman said, “but if not – we are ready.”
Soliman said Iranian President Ahmadinejad wanted to attend
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Egypt July
11-16. If he did attend, President Mubarak would meet with
him and clearly explain that Iranian interference in “Arab
issues” was unacceptable. “We are ready for good relations
with Iran,” Soliman noted, but only if Iran ceased
interfering and supporting terrorists in the region.
¶7. (S/NF) Because of domestic problems, Soliman believed that
Iran would seek better relations with the Arab world and
suspend its nuclear program for a period of time to avoid a
“war.” He also anticipated Iran would try to strike more of
a “balance” between supporting its Hezbollah and Hamas
“tools” and trying to build better relations with the Arabs.
Soliman expressed concern that Iranian influence in Iraq
would spread after the re-deployment of U.S. troops out of
Iraqi cities and the eventual drawdown. General Petraeus
noted that 130,000 U.S. troops remain and that the drawdown
would be gradual. He expressed confidence that Iranian
influence could be contained if Arab countries moved
aggressively to support Iraq.
Palestinian Reconciliation, Israel
¶8. (S/NF) Soliman explained that Egypt’s three primary
objectives with the Palestinians were to maintain calm in
Gaza, undermine Hamas, and build popular support for
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. On Gaza, Soliman said
Egypt worked closely with Israel to coordinate humanitarian
assistance shipments and was encouraging the Israelis to
allow more assistance into Gaza. Soliman said he was still
seeking a “tahdiya” (calm) agreement between Hamas and
Israel, but noted that Israel’s lack of a Gaza strategy and
desire to keep Hamas under pressure made any agreement
difficult. On undermining Hamas, Soliman said Egypt has
“stopped” money and arms from entering Gaza. “Hamas feels
they are losing their capabilities,” Soliman said, as they
are unable to re-arm using the tunneling network under the
Egypt-Gaza border. The pressure, especially from Egypt’s
success at dismantling Hamas’ funding mechanism, may render
Hamas “more flexible” than before.
¶9. (S/NF) Palestinians must believe that Abbas is capable of
securing a Palestinian state, Soliman stressed. He noted
recent positive developments in the West Bank, including
improvements in the Palestinian security forces and the
lifting of some Israeli roadblocks to facilitate commerce and
movement. He expressed concern, however, that continued
settlement activity, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s
recent “radical” speech, and insufficient economic
development in Palestinian areas were undermining the chances
for resuming peace negotiations. Soliman added that
President Mubarak may invite Nentanyahu and Abbas to Cairo if
efforts to re-start negotiations became “blocked.”
¶10. (S/NF) Soliman briefed General Petraeus on his efforts to
facilitate Palestinian reconciliation. Reconciliation
remains elusive, he noted, as neither Hamas nor Fatah really
want an agreement. The Palestinian factions were currently
in Cairo, he said, for discussions on releasing detainees.
Talks were at an impasse, however, as Hamas had suspended
reconciliation talks until Abbas released all Hamas detainees
in the West Bank, which Soliman said Abbas would never
accept. Soliman also doubted that a reconciliation agreement
would be reached by July 7 as Egypt previously announced, and
anticipated that talks would be suspended for one-two months.
Despite the challenge and frustrations, Soliman promised
that Egypt would “not give up” on Palestinian reconciliation.
“It is hard,” he continued, “but I am always optimistic. I
consider myself a patient man, but I am loosing patience.”
Syria, Yemen, Afpak
¶11. (S/NF) Soliman hoped Syria would improve its
relationship with the Arab world and the U.S. and stop
serving as “Iran’s lifeline” in the region. He also stressed
that Syria must cooperate with Iraq to improve border
security and stem the flow of foreign fighters. Soliman also
called on Syria to drop its insistence that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be solved before Syria will
reach an agreement with Israel on the Golan Heights.
¶12. (S/NF) Soliman expressed concern over instability in
CAIRO 00001349 003 OF 003
Yemen and said Egypt was trying to help President Saleh,
including by providing information on Iranian and Qatari
support to the al-Houthi insurgents. General Petraeus noted
U.S. efforts to improve Yemen’s capacity to combat
extremists. On Pakistan, General Petraeus said he was
encouraged by the Pakistani military’s operations in the Swat
Valley and Northwest Frontier Province, including their focus
on holding and rebuilding effected areas. Soliman credited
the Pakistani government for doing a better job of convincing
people that extremists pose a real threat to Pakistani
national security. On Afghanistan, General Petraeus stressed
the importance of arresting the downward spiral of violence
and improving governance after the September 20 national
¶13. (U) General Petraeus cleared this cable.
DE RUEHTV #1688/01 2111023
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301023Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2842
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 6300
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0889
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5784
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 4385
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 6619
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 2806
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 2478
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001688
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EG CH IR SA LE IS
SUBJECT: PM A/S SHAPIRO’S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO ISRAEL
REF: GRUBB-MILLER 07/22/09 E-MAIL
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
¶1. (S) Summary: Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
Affairs Andrew Shapiro met with a number of GOI officials on
July 22-23 to stress the importance of the U.S.-Israeli
political-military relationship, and to discuss among other
issues Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME). GOI
interlocutors continued to press for the opportunity to
review the QME report prior to its submission to Congress,
and presented an official response to a U.S. non-paper on
potential arms transfers to Arab countries. In that respect,
the MOD proposed technical discussions in Washington on
August 3 to further discuss GOI concerns over the potential
F-15SA transfer to Saudi Arabia. GOI officials continued to
express reservations regarding U.S. arms transfers to
Lebanon, and requested the opportunity to further discuss
U.S. strategy and intentions with respect to the Lebanese
Armed Forces. GOI interlocutors raised continued concerns
over the Iranian nuclear weapons program, noting that any
policy of engagement be done in conjunction with tougher
sanctions and for a finite period of time before turning to
other “options on the table.” Other issues raised by GOI
officials included the Peace Process, Israel’s export control
system, and potential Israeli exports to China. Both sides
agreed in principle to the next session of the Joint
Political Military Group (JPMG) in October or early November
in Israel. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) On July 22, A/S Shapiro met with MOD Director
General Pinchas Buchris, MOD Political-Military Director Amos
Gilad, Defense Export Control Directorate Chief Eli Pincu,
and participated in a roundtable discussion led by J5
Strategic Division Chief Brigadier General Yossi Heymann. At
the MFA on July 23, A/S Shapiro met with Director General
Yossi Gal and participated in a roundtable discussion led by
Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar and
Export Control Director Roey Gilad. A/S Shapiro also
participated in a strategic tour of Israel, and visited
Israeli defense company Plasan-Sasa.
¶3. (SBU) A/S Shapiro stressed the importance of the
U.S-Israeli political-military relationship, noting the
significance of visiting Israel on his first overseas trip in
his capacity as Assistant Secretary for the
Political-Military Affairs Bureau. GOI interlocutors
appreciated the opportunity to resume dialogue on this
important aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. MOD DG
Buchris noted the two still relatively new administrations in
the United States and Israel, and the importance of limiting
the number of misunderstandings in the future.
Qualitative Military Edge
¶4. (S) GOI officials reiterated the importance of maintaining
Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME). They said that
Israel understands U.S. policy intentions to arm moderate
Arab states in the region to counter the Iranian threat, and
prefers such sales originate from the United States instead
of other countries like Russia or China. However, Israel
continues to stress the importance of identifying potential
risks that may become future threats or adversaries, and for
this reason maintains several objections as indicated in the
official GOI response to the QME non-paper on potential U.S.
arms sales to the region (ref e-mail to PM/RSAT separately).
¶5. (S) GOI officials also expressed continued interest in
reviewing the QME report prior to its submission to Congress.
A/S Shapiro reiterated that the report was based on an
assessment from the intelligence community, and therefore not
releasable to the GOI. He referenced previous points made to
the Israeli embassy in Washington regarding the report, and
welcomed any comments the GOI might have — although such
comments should be delivered as soon as possible as the
report is already overdue. Israeli interlocutors appreciated
the classified nature of the report, but also made clear it
was difficult to comment on the report’s results without
reviewing its content or intelligence assessment. In that
respect, Buchris and other GOI officials requested that the
QME process be reviewed in light of future QME reports.
¶6. (S) GOI interlocutors attempted to make the argument that
moderate Arab countries could in the future become
adversaries — and that this should be taken into account in
the QME process. During a roundtable discussion led by the
MFA’s Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar,
the MFA’s Center for Policy Research gave intelligence briefs
on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon to further support the
argument that these countries could become future foes.
Policy Research Center interlocutors reviewed succession
concerns in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Bar argued that a
perceived closure in the capability gap between Israel and
Arab states, coupled with a nuclear-armed Iran, could compel
moderate Arab states to reassess the notion that Israel was a
fixture in the region.
¶7. (S) Typically frank, MOD Political-Military Chief Amos
Gilad was not certain how much longer Egyptian President
Mubarak would live, and questioned whether his son Gamal was
ready to assume command. Gilad said the Egyptian military
led by Defense Minister Tantawi continues to train and
exercise as if “Israel was its only enemy.” He added that
there were disturbing signs on the Egyptian streets, as women
are dressed more conservatively, and that peace with Israel
“is too thin, too superficial.” On Saudi Arabia, Gilad said
that King Abdullah does not hate Israel, but his chief
priority is the survival of the regime.
¶8. (S) The GOI official response to the arms transfer
non-paper includes several objections, such as the potential
transfer of systems for the F-15SA to Saudi Arabia, including
the Enhanced Paveway II, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System,
and AESA radar. Buchris said the GOI is ready to establish a
working group to discuss the F-15SA transfer, and proposed an
Israeli technical team accompany BG Heymann to Washington (in
town for a missile defense meeting) on August 3 to discuss
the issue further. Buchris said the sale of the F-15SA was
not the problem, but rather the weapons systems included on
the planes and the location of the planes in Saudi Arabia.
¶9. (S) The GOI remains concerned about U.S. arms transfers to
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and has requested the
opportunity to discuss further U.S. intentions regarding the
LAF. A/S Shapiro said the results of the Lebanese elections
represented a turning point, and rejection of Hizballah and
its Iranian sponsors. The need to build up Lebanese
institutions, including the army, was now more important than
ever, he argued. A/S Shapiro said the LAF has thus far
demonstrated a solid record of accounting for U.S. systems
transferred to Lebanon.
¶10. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the elections in Lebanon
were positive, but countered that Hizballah’s influence
remains strong. He argued that items such as the Cessna
Caravan and the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) lack
sufficient mitigation measures, which creates the potential
for an incident along the Israel-Lebanese border. Amos Gilad
said the GOI does not believe the LAF will attack Israel.
However, given the ties between Hizballah and the LAF, he was
certain the IDF would eventually face the LAF in any conflict
¶11. (S) Analysts from the MFA’s Center for Policy Research
argued there has been no dramatic change in the political
arena despite the March 14 coalition’s significant victory in
the elections. They said the fragile political situation in
Lebanon is currently stable, but Hizballah still possesses an
unofficial veto over policy. Long term prospects will be
tested by the Hariri Tribunal and Hizballah’s desire for a
reprisal to the 2008 Mughniyeh assassination. MFA Policy
Research analysts further argued that the LAF faces
tremendous pressure following the recent explosion of a
Hizballah arms cache near the Lebanese-Israeli border. MFA
DG Yossi Gal noted that UNIFIL had been prevented from
investigating the explosion, and raised the recent crossing
by Lebanese citizens into Israeli territory to plant Lebanese
and Hizballah flags. He said French and Italian delegations
had praised the GOI’s restraint in these cases.
¶12. (S) A/S Shapiro asked if the election results might be
the result in part of a backlash in the Christian community
against Hizballah; the Policy Research analysts countered
that the results were indicative of several factors,
including the influx of Saudi money and an unstable
opposition camp. They agreed that Hizballah leader Nasrallah
might be a bit chastened following the elections, as
suggested by A/S Shapiro, but that Hizballah continues to try
and undermine the March 14 coalition.
¶13. (S) During the MOD roundtable discussion, BG Heymann also
acknowledged the positive results of the elections. However,
he feared the outcome did not represent the real power of the
Shi’ites in Lebanon. He agreed that moderates and the LAF
must be strengthened, but expressed deep concerns about
ongoing cooperation between Hizballah and the LAF. He also
said that such aid to Lebanon be paired with efforts to halt
smuggling and directly weaken Hizballah.
¶14. (S) BG Heymann also cited concerns regarding mitigation
measures for the Caravan and Raven in order to prevent an
“accidental engagement” by the IAF. Overall, he was
skeptical that these systems would benefit the LAF, and said
the GOI would appreciate a more in-depth conversation
regarding U.S. intentions and overarching strategy with
respect to the LAF. Heymann suggested further talks to
coincide with the August 3rd F-15 technical discussion in
Washington; MFA DDG Bar echoed this request. A/S Shapiro
offered to take that back to Washington for review. If it
proved too difficult on short notice to bring together
interagency experts to discuss US intentions with the LAF,
A/S Shapiro suggested it be included in the Joint Political
Military Group talks later in the fall.
¶15. (S) Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons remains the GOI’s
primary focus. Buchris stated bluntly that it was not clear
to him where U.S. policy was heading with regard to Iran. In
separate meetings, Buchris and Amos Gilad said that Israel’s
preeminent priority is to prevent Iran’s nuclear weapons
program, which if realized would cause a nuclear arms race
across the Middle East as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt
pursue similar programs in response. Gilad was skeptical
that engagement would work, noting Iranian desires to
“establish a new empire” and pointing to Iranian support for
Hizballah and “Hamastan.” Buchris added that the United
States’ desire to engage with Iran should be accompanied by
tough sanctions, and only pursued for a finite period of
time; MFA DG Gal concurred. Alluding to a potential military
strike, Buchris said “all options must remain on the table,”
and acknowledged that part of his job was insuring Israel was
ready to employ such an option, no matter how undesirable it
¶16. (S) A/S Shapiro made clear that a nuclear armed Iran was
unacceptable to the United States. He referenced Secretary
Clinton’s July 15 foreign policy address at the Council on
Foreign Relations, noting the offer of engagement with Iran
— but reinforcing that such an offer is not indefinite. A/S
Shapiro argued that an Iranian rejection of our offer to
engage will only help bolster international support for
increased sanctions. He also pointed to the uncertain
situation following the Iranian elections — it was unclear
at this point how the regime in Tehran will react to our
offer of engagement. That said, he repeated that the
engagement offer was not unlimited, noting that the United
States will reassess its engagement strategy with Iran later
¶17. (S) A/S Shapiro cited a commonality of interests with the
Gulf States, which also view Iran as the preeminent threat —
we should take advantage of this commonality, he said.
During the J5 roundtable discussion, IDF interlocutors
expressed skepticism that proposed military assistance to the
Gulf would help against Iran, as some of the systems slated
for delivery are not designed to counter the threats, nuclear
and asymmetrical, posed by Iran. A/S Shapiro agreed that
assistance to Gulf states should not diminish Israel’s QME,
but argued that it sends a signal to those countries (as well
as Iran) that they have strong allies in the West. It also
helps convince these regimes that their best interests lie
with the moderate camp rather than with Iran.
¶18. (S) Buchris said the lack of an appointed U.S. special
envoy focusing on Iran suggested the United States did not
believe Iran was a priority. A/S Shapiro reassured Buchris
that Iran was a top priority as President Obama and Secretary
Clinton are intensely focused on Iran. The fact that Tehran
has not responded to our offer of engagement makes a special
envoy responsible for negotiations not as important, A/S
Shapiro said — in any case, much of the discussion will be
behind the scenes.
¶19. (S) Buchris referenced a press report from Secretary
Clinton’s trip to Jakarta in which she said the United States
would consider providing a defense umbrella for moderate Arab
countries in the Middle East should Iran acquire a nuclear
weapon. Buchris argued that such a statement already
conceded the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran. MFA Deputy
Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar also raised
the Secretary’s Jakarta statement; A/S Shapiro stated that
the Secretary’s comments did not indicate a new policy
approach, but were meant as a deterrent factor toward Iran’s
nuclear weapons ambitions — not as a concession — and that
journalists covering the trip attempted to make more out of
the statement than was intended.
¶20. (S) Amos Gilad referenced Russia’s potential sale of the
S-300 missile system to Iran, noting that Russian
interlocutors initially denied the S-300 contract with Iran,
and then later admitted it had been signed but added that the
system would not be delivered for political reasons.
However, Gilad said the Russians would reassess this
political calculation should the United States continue to
pursue missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech
Republic. He speculated that the Iranians would continue to
put pressure on Russia to sell the system rather than pursue
alternative Chinese systems. He said the Russians appear
committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons,
but he personally had doubts about their intelligence
capabilities following their lack of knowledge regarding the
Syrian nuclear project.
¶21. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the Palestinian Authority
was doing a “good job” in the West Bank, noting respect for
Palestinian Security Forces (PASF) as they take more control
of security — giving them the chance to succeed was
important, Buchris said. He also commended the work of
United States Security Coordinator Gen. Dayton in training
the PASF. That said, Buchris argued the way ahead would be
difficult, given the divide between Hamas and Fatah.
Reconciliation talks between the two have stalled — Amos
Gilad said both sides are “more interested in swallowing one
another” than negotiating. Behind the scenes discussions
with Hamas by European countries and even U.S. visitors have
not helped the situation, Buchris said. A/S Shapiro deferred
to Special Envoy Sen. George Mitchell’s efforts, but noted
Secretary Clinton’s point that a stronger PA will offer an
alternative to Hamas. He also stressed Secretary Clinton’s
remarks during her July 15 speech that the United States will
not engage with Hamas unless it has accepted the Quartet
¶22. (C) MOD Defense Export Control Directorate (DECD) Chief
Eli Pincu reviewed the export control system, emphasizing an
improved process, but also acknowledging the potential for
improvement. He gave a brief presentation regarding Israeli
export controls, including enhanced legislation,
cross-ministry coordination, enhanced enforcement, and
increased industry outreach and training. He noted 780
registered exporters in Israel; for 2009, 31,373 marketing
licenses had thus far been issued, with 1,198 denials and 219
returned without action. MFA Export Control Director Roey
Gilad stressed the partnership between the MOD and MFA on
export licenses, and explained the system’s dispute
resolution mechanism in the event the MFA and MOD disagree on
a particular case.
¶23. (C) Both Pincu and Roey Gilad noted that the GOI
continues to seek assistance in closing export control
loopholes, including brokering. Pincu noted that brokering
had been included in the Defense Export Control Act, but that
accompanying implementation legislation had not yet entered
in to force. Pincu said the GOI had consulted with Germany,
the United Kingdom, France, and Japan on its brokering laws,
and planned to raise it during the annual defense export
control working group to be held in Washington in October.
Roey Gilad and other DECD officials also hope to travel to
Washington in the near future to further discuss brokering
¶24. (C) MFA Export Control Director Roey Gilad reiterated
that the GOI in no way desires to compromise U.S. national
interests with respect to exports to China. He noted,
however, that the U.S. Department of Commerce created in 2007
a list of exemptions for certain items if sent to validated
end users in China. Gilad questioned whether the same
exemptions might be possible for Israel. As it currently
stands, the GOI must pursue any export to China through the
bilateral statement of understanding with the United States.
While the statement calls for expeditious resolution of any
requests to export to China, it often takes up to 80 days to
obtain approval. By that time, Gilad said, China has often
found the item through another supplier. Moreover, the
Israeli export control system requires a 20-working day
turn-around on all export license requests — which is not
possible, given the length of time required to obtain an
answer from the United States. A/S Shapiro offered to raise
the issue in Washington.
¶25. (SBU) A/S Shapiro suggested the next session of the Joint
Political Military Group (JPMG) convene shortly after the
Jewish holidays, most likely in October or early November.
GOI officials agreed in principle, and will look at the
calendar and propose dates.
¶26. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared this cable.
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv’s Classified Website:
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FOR S AND S/SRAP HOLBROOKE
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA
E.O. 12958: 07/21/2019
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS IR IS AF PK SY LE SA
SUBJECT: UAE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE (GSD) JULY 20 PLENARY SESSION AND
ABU DHABI 00000744 001.2 OF 004
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D’AFFAIRES DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4 B
¶1. (S/NF) In a July 20 plenary session of the GSD with a large UAE
delegation, accompanied by a smaller session with the UAE Chief of
Staff, the immediate focus was largely on Iran. Participants
reiterated the good defense cooperation that the U.S. and UAE enjoy,
while noting the need to improve coordination further to deal with
real and urgent threats in the region. In this regard, the UAE put
the threat of Iran’s potential reaction to a “likely” Israeli attack
on its nuclear program at the center of scenarios to be considered.
Other issues, to include Yemen, counter-proliferation, Pakistan, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and extremism were also addressed, but
even these were often seen through the prism of Iranian intentions.
¶2. (S/NF) This message begins with the Chief of Staff’s urgent plea
on “munitions” to deal with an unpredictable Iran, followed by a
synopsis of GSD plenary proceedings. A list of UAE participants is
included at para 20. End summary.
Chief of Staff Presses for Munitions:
Urgent about Iran’s unpredictability
¶3. (S/NF) In a brief session with principals only, Chief of Staff
Hamad Thani al-Romaithi (who also participated in the MbZ dinner and
was on his way to Lebanon later July 20) said the UAE cannot act
alone in the region and needs coherent plans — especially to deal
with the unique threat of Iran. How to deter Iran without provoking
it is a challenge. Ambassador al-Otaiba emphasized how the proximity
of the UAE to Iran magnifies the threat perception; the CoS said UAE
military planning had to consider worst-case scenarios.
¶4. (S/NF) ASD Vershbow said the USG did not disagree with the UAE
evaluation of Iran’s objectives, but that we need to work to prevent
them from achieving those objectives. Diplomacy is only one tool.
The USG wants to help provide the UAE with defensive capabilities and
our troop presence here should help act as a deterrent to Iran. We
don’t want to signal that we will give up on diplomacy, yet in
parallel to that effort we intend to keep the pressure on Iran. We
appreciate the candor of our defense engagement with the UAE. We are
dealing with an unpredictable foe and need to take all precautions.
¶5. (S/NF) The CoS said Iran will remain a threat in any case, as its
objectives are constant. He added that if the Israelis strike, Iran
may lash out at the UAE and around the Gulf — one can conceive of
many possible scenarios from missile strikes to attacks on isolated
islands to the exploitation of 130,000 Iranians living in the UAE.
The UAE therefore seeks ongoing support from the region’s “main
actor,” the U.S., and desires close defense coordination. The UAE’s
friends in the GCC, on the other hand, are not always realistic in
their approach to Iran, he said, citing Arab misinterpretation of
“brotherly” Iraqi intentions with regards to Kuwait back in 1990.
¶6. (S/NF) ASD Vershbow said that our message to Iran is that threats
against our allies will not go unanswered. We need to be prepared in
case deterrence does not work, with the realization that with or
without nuclear weapons Iran seeks to be a dominant power in the
region. This is a very interconnected region, asserted the CoS. “If
I was in the Israelis’ shoes, I would attack, to reduce the nuclear
threat.” The first reaction may be that the Iranians launch missiles
against targets in Israel and then the Gulf, he added. Air Chief
Sweidan added that the UAE needs munitions on a tighter timeline than
previously assumed — with urgent needs in 2010, 11, and 12. He said
the UAE Armed Forces could receive munitions from the U.S. inventory
and then replenish them later (he supplied the same list of
requirements as was relayed some months ago, noting that they had
only received a “political” answer to that inquiry thus far).
ABU DHABI 00000744 002 OF 004
¶7. (S/NF) The CoS was appreciative of Patriot deployments, progress
on command and control systems, and movement toward more effective
shared early warning, but lamented that other pieces of the air
defense puzzle require immediate attention. Ambassador al-Otaiba
reiterated the need to “borrow from U.S. inventories” to meet urgent
timelines. A/S Vershbow said we were leaning far forward for the UAE
on THAAD, for example, and would continue to look into opportunities
to assist, including filling gaps before UAE-purchased systems were
¶8. (S/NF) Highlighting the importance of close defense coordination,
the CoS noted that in the event of an attack the UAE may have no time
to react. Taking the fight to Iran may require “passing over U.S.
aircraft carriers,” for example, so we need to be in lock-step at all
phases of preparation and operation.
¶9. (C) The Plenary session of the U.S.-UAE Gulf Security Dialogue
(GSD) convened July 20 at the Armed Forces Officers’ Club, with newly
promoted Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Ali Hamad Subaih
al-Kaabi stating that the “small but significant” Gulf region makes a
large contribution to global peace and development and seeks enhanced
cooperation with the U.S. He cited UAE troops in Afghanistan, U.S.
use of UAE bases, a robust intelligence exchange, strong
counter-terror efforts, and improved border control as evidence that
the UAE shares common goals with the U.S. Citing the “high
importance” of strong relations among GCC members, he thanked the
U.S. for its role in the defense relationship and wanted to learn
more about U.S. strategies vis-a-vis Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
¶10. (C) Assistant Secretary of Defense Vershbow, leading the U.S.
team along with Assistant State of State for Political-Military
AffairsShapiro, expressed confidence in the strength and future of
the bilateral relationship, anchored by common strategic interests.
Recounting shared priorities, he noted that the GSD was being taken
to a new level as we seek strategic synergy in facing real threats
like Iran — which we are obligated to defend against. He called for
a more multi-lateral approach to counter-proliferation and cited the
need to prepare missile defenses. He lauded the UAE decision to host
LEADING EDGE 2009 and cited the 123 agreement with the U.S. as the
high standard on civil nuclear cooperation. The responsible drawdown
of U.S. troops in Iraq also calls for continued UAE support, he
emphasized, as Iraq seeks to assume responsibility for its own
security and integrate into the region. The UAE’s advanced fighter
squadron, growing air defense net, participation in RED FLAG, and
leadership of CTF 152 are all indications of a maturing defense
¶11. (C) A/S Shapiro emphasized the USG desire to ensure regional
stability, counter extremism, curb WMD proliferation, and tackle the
inter-related challenges of the region holistically. He focused on
the threat from Iran, stressing that the USG was attempting a
diplomatic solution — if possible — and would proceed in
consultation with our friends in the region. Recounting the basic
components of our Iraq policy, he also highlighted the need to
strengthen the institutions of government in Lebanon and build
capacity within the Palestinian Authority.
UAE offers threat analysis: all Iran
¶12. (S) The UAE’s presentation of the primary regional threat
assessed that Iran’s leadership “genuinely believes that it has
emerged victorious from its clash with the U.S.,” with gains made in
Iraq, an expanding “Shi’a tide” in the region, an ongoing nuclear
program, missile modernization, and continued provocation of
resistance in Gaza. While Israel was able to neutralize to some
degree threats on its flanks in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008/9),
ABU DHABI 00000744 003 OF 004
Iran’s main goals of regional influence were not inhibited. The UAE
assessment continued that Israel may act on its perception that only
“extreme” (and unlikely) UNSC action or unilateral Israeli military
action can slow Iran’s nuclear goals. As Iran continues to reject a
political solution, the UAE must prepare for the fallout should
Israel act on its fears. With that, the briefer introduced a slide
on Iran’s capabilities, with missile sites in the south of Iran and
concentric circles showing their likely range all covering UAE
¶13. (S) Iranian promotion of “Shi’ism,” coupled with sleeper cells
in the region, magnify the threat articulated by the UAE. If
attacked, it may seek to obstruct shipping in the Gulf and control
(more) islands over which it does not have legitimate sovereignty.
Working in alliance with al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi’a, Iran
is poised to do damage of an unpredictable nature if/when provoked.
In sum, Iran continued as the traditional focus of the threat
briefing offered by the UAE at GSD sessions. Other regional concerns
noted in lesser detail included Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism, and piracy.
¶14. (C) In further briefings, the UAE team highlighted good
operational cooperation with the U.S. and offered a review of the
maturing Critical National Infrastructure Agency (CNIA) which is
taking charge of security on land, along the coast, and off shore —
with an initial focus on Abu Dhabi but an intent to serve as a
federal agency. The U.S. Coast Guard and NYPD were cited as partners
in the growing CNIA mission, with a U.S. promise of first-time
“Nuclear Security Training” in the near future.
¶15. (S) The UAE delegation received a draft “UAE National Defense
Strategy and U.S.-UAE Comprehensive Defense Strategy” document
outlining key priorities in the defense relationship (a document
proposed by UAE Ambassador to Washington Yousef al-Otaiba). Without
immediate comment on the substance of the USG draft, al-Kaabi said
the UAE would reply via embassy channels and looked forward to
continuing the dialogue.
Q&A on Iran, Yemen
¶16. (C) When the floor was open to general discussion, two topics
dominated: Iran and Yemen. The UAE asked whether the USG had any
new information since the December 2007 NIE regarding Iran’s nuclear
weaponization program; the U.S. team noted that a new estimate was in
progress but it was premature to comment. The DMI representative
also noted that Iran exploits crises for its own advantage, making
the defusing of crises like Palestine and Lebanon imperative if we
are to keep Iran in check. In the case of Palestine, he added
optimistically, it is time to “cut to the chase” and deal with final
status issues; Lebanon is also ripe for progress, he suggested,
without a drawn out process.
¶17. (S) On Yemen, the UAE said it shared a U.S. concern that a
“failed state” could emerge on the Arabian Peninsula, with terrorist
partners and Iranian influence further poisoning the mix. A
collapsed Yemen “gives us Afghanistan,” said Commander of the Air
Force and Air Defense Major General Hamad bin Suweidan al-Qamzi, and
then it presents a long-term threat to the region. He said the UAE
was coordinating economic development support for Yemen while also
trying to assist with political reconciliation. He noted the dangers
of “another Somalia.” ASD Vershbow hoped the UAE could help secure a
unified GCC approach to Yemen, as time is running out on the
seccession question and Yemen cannot afford a “two front” war with
both seccesionists and the Al-Houthi insurgency. In a brief
discussion of Pakistan, all agreed that Islamabad needs to focus
resources to fight insurgency rather than obsessing with India as its
potential military foe.
ABU DHABI 00000744 004 OF 004
¶18. (C) Enhanced U.S.-UAE cooperation to counter troublesome
financial flows and cash smuggling — solidified during a recent
visit by Treasury Secretary Geithner — was noted by the Charge as
another area of productive engagement. Both sides also put in very
positive words about the role of the Air Warfare Center which has
become a proud center of excellence for the region.
¶19. (S) In closing, al-Kaabi raised Iran yet again, noting that its
leadership is not likely to change fundamentally and therefore the
threat is likely to continue. He looked forward to ongoing
discussion of the defense strategy discussed earlier as we continue
to pursue a common vision.
¶20. (SBU) UAE delegation:
— Staff Major General Ali Hamad Subaih al-Kaabi, Deputy Chief of
— Staff Major General (Pilot) Hamad bin Suweidan al-Qamzi,
Commander of Air Force and Air Defense
— Staff Colonel Abdullah Saeed al-Hamoodi, Intelligence and
— Lt. Colonel (Dr.) Albadr Shareef al-Shatri, Intelligence and
— Staff Brigadier General Khalfan al-Kaabi, Ground Forces
— Staff Colonel (Pilot) Salim Saeed, Ground Forces
— Staff Lt. Colonel Abdullah al-Yamahi, Directorate of Joint
— Brigadier General (Dr.) Humaid Ali al-Kitbi, Purchasing
— Staff Colonel Saeed Rashid al-Shihi, CNIA
— Staff Brigadier General Mohamed Murad al-Baloushi, Air Forces
— Colonel (Engineer) Ahmad Sultan, Air Forces
— Staff Lt. Colonel Engineer Jamal Mohamed al-Ameri, Air Forces
— Major Juma Sultan, Air Forces
— Staff Major (Pilot) Ali Saleh, Air Forces
— Major (Pilot) Abdullah Sultan al-Mazroui, GSD secretariat for
¶21. (U) The GSD traveling party approved this message .
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DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA
E.O. 12958: 07/22/2019
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS IR IS AF PK SY LE SA
SUBJECT: (S) MbZ HOSTS GULF SECURITY DINNER WITH ISA ASD VERSHBOW AND
PM A/S SHAPIRO
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D’AFFAIRES DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4 B
REF A SECRETARY’S LETTER TO MBZ ON PUMA HELICOPTERS
REF B SECSTATE 76108
¶1. (S) Summary: Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ, also
Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces and de facto defense
chief) hosted a July 19 executive session of the Gulf Security
Dialogue in Abu Dhabi (July 20 plenary with UAE uniformed officers
reported septel). The U.S. delegation was led by Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow and
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew
Shapiro. MbZ called for advanced U.S.-UAE joint military
coordination and faster delivery of FMS items to respond to a
worst-case scenario in Iran. As with other senior U.S. officials
(but with increasing alarm and a shortening time frame), MbZ focused
on the Iranian threat and his belief that an Israeli pre-emptive
strike on Iran is likely in a matter of months. ASD Vershbow assured
MbZ of the U.S. commitment to UAE security; A/S Shapiro relayed that
this visit was his first since taking his new position – reflecting
the importance we place on the relationship. Discussions also
centered on UAE military and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan
and Pakistan and the peace process. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) hosted a
working dinner with U.S. Gulf Security Dialogue delegation the
evening of July 19. The U.S. Delegation was led by Assistant
Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro and
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Alexander Vershbow and included RADM William Payne, Ambassador, and
DCM. The UAE was represented by Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Hamad Thani al-Rumaithi, Ambassador to the U.S. Yousef al-Otaiba,
Under Secretary of the Crown Prince’s Court Mohamed al-Mazrouei,
Deputy Chief of Staff Ali Hamad al-Kaabi and Air Force Chief Mohammed
Joint Planning for Worst-Case Scenario in Iran
¶3. (S) In a three-hour working dinner, MbZ focused primarily on his
overarching concern — the threat from Iran, stressing as he has with
other senior U.S. officials that U.S. engagement with Iran will
ultimately fail and that he fears a surprise (Israeli pre-emptive
strike on Iran) in a shorter timeframe than USG estimates (he fears
it could happen this year). ASD Vershbow assured MbZ of the U.S.
commitment to UAE security; A/S Shapiro relayed that his trip to the
UAE was his first since taking on his new position, reflecting the
importance we place on the relationship.
¶4. (S/NF) MbZ reiterated his belief that an Israeli pre-emptive
strike against Iran was increasingly likely, saying he was convinced
the Netanyahu government was prepared to act against Iran, and that
he agreed with Israeli intelligence assessments regarding how close
Tehran is to achieving its nuclear ambitions. The Iranian response
to a pre-emptive strike, predicted MbZ, would be attacks on U.S.
allies in the region, foremost among them the UAE; Iran may also
unleash terrorist cells against western interests around the world.
ASD Vershbow explained that the USG assessment differed in timeframe
— we do not anticipate military confrontation with Iran before the
end of 2009 — stressing, however, that denying Iran’s nuclear
ambitions and stemming its efforts to achieve regional hegemony were
foremost among U.S. international security concerns.
¶5. (S) In response to MbZ’s position that ultimately engagement
efforts with Iran would fail, both ASD and A/S made clear than while
the USG continues to press for a diplomatic solution, the offer of
engagement is not opened-ended and will not come at the expense of
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¶6. (S) Referring to the Iran Region Presence Office (IRPO) in Dubai,
MbZ asked “how’s that office doing?” He did not demonstrate any
particular concern or sensitivity regarding IRPO activities in UAE.
MbZ said that the Iranian regime was in trouble internally and would
move swiftly to oppress post-election opposition. As for Rafsanjani,
MbZ said he was a “survivor” who would not succeed in a leadership
bid because he will not act unless he is one-hundred percent sure he
will win. Again turning to his primary security concern, MbZ
suggested that Tehran would likely accelerate its nuclear program to
draw attention away from its internal weakness and to foment
nationalism among its citizenry. “Time is not on our side”, he said,
hinting that a move should be made against Iran and “the sooner the
¶7. (C)ASD Vershbow briefed MbZ on the positive outcome of POTUS’s
recent talks in Moscow. MbZ said that he had met with Putin in June
and he did not believe Russia saw a nuclearized Iran as a challenge
to its interests, nor did Putin appreciate the threat of regional
proliferation in response to an Iranian bomb. He encouraged the U.S.
to continue to press the Russians saying he believed if the Russians
came over to our side, (with regard to tougher sanctions), the
Chinese would follow. MbZ said his he would travel in late July to
Beijing, where he will surely press the Chinese on Iran. ASD
Vershbow suggested he urge the Chinese to send Iran a message by
diversifying its oil imports away from Iran.
Afghanistan – Neighbors Not Doing Enough
¶8. (S/NF) MbZ complained that Arab regimes are not doing enough to
help in Afghanistan. He said that as of one month ago, he surveyed
the region and found that only Oman had funded its Tokyo conference
pledge of $2 million. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Qatar in
particular for not doing their part, saying that the Saudis clearly
did not see how important it was to their own interests.
¶9. (S/NF) MbZ criticized other regional leaders for playing both
sides and for “dating” Iran. MbZ compared the current situation to
pre-WWII Europe saying, “Ahmedinejad is Hitler,” and neighboring
capitals believe erroneously that they can prevent Iranian
retaliation by playing nice or signing agreements with Tehran. “They
think the are backing the winning horse,” MbZ explained, emphasizing
that if they think that by appeasing Iran they will avoid Iranian
retaliation “then they are seriously mistaken, Sir.”
National Defense Strategy
¶10. (S) Throughout the discussions, MbZ repeatedly called for
coordinated military planning for the worst-case scenario of an
unpredictable Iranian response to an Israeli strike, stressing that
U.S.-UAE preparations must begin now well before commencement of
hostilities. Both sides agreed that improved coordination was a good
idea, with ASD Vershbow utilizing the opportunity to push for a UAE
national defense strategy. (Note: GSD July 20 plenary meeting
reported septel. End Note.)
Pakistan – 14 Additional PUMAs
¶11. (C) Passing a letter from Secretary Clinton thanking the UAE for
its transfer of 14 U.S.-origin PUMA helicopters to Pakistan, A/S
Shapiro thanked MbZ for the UAEG’s partnership and regional
leadership in providing assistance to Pakistan as well as its
long-term participation in the coalition in Afghanistan. MbZ updated
the delegation on delivery status, saying that 10 of the promised 14
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had been delivered and the remaining 4 would shortly follow. He
added that efforts were underway to find and purchase additional
helicopters, announcing (for the first time that we have heard this)
the UAE’s intentions to provide Pakistan with an additional 14 PUMAs.
Humanitarian Aid for CT
¶12. (C) In the context of defeating AQ in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
MbZ called for Arab and Muslim regimes to do more to stem terrorist
financing, whether it means closing down charities, business
interests, “whatever is necessary.” He also pointed to the
zealousness of Arab fighters vice Afghani nationals. Nine-five
percent of Arab fighters go to Afghanistan knowing they are going to
die for ideological reasons. Afghan nationals, on the other hand,
are more practical. “This makes one of them [Arabs] more valuable to
AQ than ten or more Afghan fighters.” Afghanis, MbZ pointed out,
have tribes, families, homes — therefore the best way to counter
local extremism in Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, is
to improve the quality of life.
¶13. (SBU) MbZ described UAE humanitarian commitments of $300 million
to build “model villages” in Afghanistan, complete with housing,
hospitals and schools. He invited the USG to join the UAE, Germany
and France in this effort. A/S Shapiro stressed the urgency of the
displaced persons crisis in the Swat region of Pakistan, suggesting
the UAE consider housing aid in this region. MbZ replied “Why not?
We will try to help wherever needed.”
MbZ on Pakistani Leadership
¶14. (S/NF) MbZ shared his assessment of the current Pakistani
leadership saying President “Zardarni is dirty but not dangerous,”
while Prime Minister Sharif is “dangerous but not dirty — this is
Pakistan. Sharif cannot be trusted to honor his promises. MbZ
continued that a new personality may emerge but for the time being
the UAE position was to play a helpful role by supporting the PM.
Lebanon – Support for LAF and PM Hariri
¶15. (C) ASD Vershbow reiterated our request that the UAEG assist the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by funding the purchase and transfer of
some of 56 U.S.-origin tanks from Jordan to Lebanon, noting our
appreciation of the UAE’s earlier funding of the first 10 tanks.
This would help capitalize on the positive outcome of the elections
and help reduce Hezbollah’s (and Iran’s) influence in Lebanon.
Promising to look into what the UAE could do to help with this
matter, MbZ asked if we had made the same request to Doha. ASD
replied that we had and that he would do so again when he arrived in
Qatar July 20.
¶16. (C) Reiterating his favored theme of the generation gap in
regional leadership (UAE having already passed the baton to the
younger generation), MbZ praised Lebanese PM Saad Hariri, saying he
was a good man. “He feels very threatened at the moment (presumably
by the Syrian regime), and it is important we do not lose him.” A/S
Shapiro agreed, pointing to U.S. security assistance as proof of our
concern and suggested that the UAE support U.S. efforts to strengthen
Lebanese government institutions as the best opportunity to build GOL
stability and security.
July 18 Nasrallah Speech
¶17. (S) MbZ pointed to Hezbollah SYG Hassan Nasrallah’s July 18
speech, saying he believed it reflected a change in Hezbollah’s tone
due to calculations that its Iranian backers were currently in a
weakened state post-Presidential elections. MbZ said that Nasrallah
is likely suffering from decreased financial support, at least for
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the next six months.
Behavior Change in Syria – I Think Not
¶18. (S/NF) Vershbow pointed to recent progress with Syria on border
control issues to stem the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq as a
small step forward in effort at eliciting behavioral change from
Damascus. MbZ showed no confidence that Syria could be separated
from the Iranian camp. “If you want my opinion,” replied MbZ, “I
think not.” He advised that Syria had a lot of options and that,
judging from past behavior, the regime would continue hedging on key
regional issues (Iran, support for Hezbollah, peace process) for the
Praise for Bahraini Crown Prince
¶19. (C) MbZ said that a two-state solution was the only option for
solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue. MbZ praised the Bahraini
Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al Khalifa for his “courageous”
(July 17) editorial in the Washington Post (ref B), commenting that
not enough Arab countries we on the right side of this issue.
¶20. (U) ASD Vershbow and A/S Shapiro cleared this message