October 09

Australia supported the US against the Goldstone Report after a US demarche

09CANBERRA926 2009-10-14 06:52 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Canberra

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SUBJECT, SIGNATURE)

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER IS KPAL
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA SUPPORTS U.S. POSITION ON GOLDSTONE
REPORT

REF: STATE 106423

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Australia will support the U.S. position
on the Goldstone Report (State 106423) and will instruct its
UN Missions in New York and Geneva to coordinate with their
U.S. counterparts. DFAT Security Council Task Force Head
Bassim Blazey, who is acting First Assistant Secretary for
IO, told us October 14 that he would instruct the Australian
Mission in New York to look for an opportunity to speak at
the UNSC Open Debate. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SUB) Pol/EconCouns delivered the demarche (State 106423)
to Acting 1st Assistant Secretary for International
Organizations, Bassim Blazey. Blazey was receptive and
indicated Australia’s willingness to work with the United
States on this issue.

¶3. (SBU) According to Blazey, Australia will instruct its
U.N. delegations in New York and Geneva to coordinate with
the U.S. delegations prior to the Security Council Meeting on
the 14th of October and the Human Rights Committee on the
15th and 16th. Australia will support the U.S. position on
the Gladstone Report and the peace process, and that will
oppose any effort to have the Security Council take up the
issue. Blazey agreed that he would encourage the Australian
delegation to try and find an opportunity to speak during the
open debate at the Security Council.

CLUNE

09VATICAN106 2009-10-16 14:02 2010-12-21 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Vatican

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SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 10/16/2034
TAGS PREL, SCUL, VT, IS
SUBJECT: (C) VATICAN BACKS AWAY FROM DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL
HOLOCAUST TASK FORCE

REF: A. VATICAN 25 B. VATICAN 99
VATICAN 00000106 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Julieta Valls Noyes, DCM, EXEC, State. REASON:

1.4 (b) 1. (C) Summary: On October 13, the Holy See walked back from a prior written agreement to become an observer on the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research (ITF). The decision may been taken by the Vatican’s relatively inexperienced new deputy foreign minister, and if so, would not be the first time he has complicated Vatican foreign relations. But the Vatican may also be pulling back due to concerns about ITF pressure to declassify records from the WWII-era pontificate of Pope Pius XII. Regardless of the cause, the ITF will continue to pursue closer ties with the Holy See in the months ahead. End Summary.

High Hopes Dashed
—————–

¶2. (C) Three members of the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research (ITF) visited Rome this week to finalize arrangements with the Holy See to become an ITF observer. However, over lunch on October 13, the team members told the Austrian Ambassador and UK and U.S. DCM’s that the plan had fallen apart completely that morning due to Vatican back-pedaling. Team members — Austrian Ambassador Ferdinand Trauttsmandorff, U.S. Professor Steve Katz of the Elie Wiesel Center at Boston University, and Dina Porat, the Israeli academic advisor to the ITF — expressed considerable disappointment about the unexpected set-back.

¶3. (C) They were especially chagrined, Trauttsmandorff said, because the Vatican had first offered more than the ITF asked then rescinded its commitment. Specifically, the ITF had suggested during a February visit to Rome that the Vatican enter into a “special arrangement” with the body. The February talks and follow up discussions went very well (ref a). Subsequently, the then-Deputy Foreign Minister-equivalent at the Holy See, Monsignor Pietro Parolin, wrote to the ITF to indicate that the Vatican wanted more than a “special arrangement” and was prepared to become an ITF observer. (Note: It’s unclear whether Parolin suggested permanent observer or observer country status for the Vatican. End Note)

New Vatican Team Disappoints
—————————-

¶4. (C) On arrival in Rome in October, though, the ITF had to deal with a new team, as the highly-regarded Parolin had been promoted and sent as Nuncio to Venezuela. Parolin’s successor, Msgr. Ettore Balestrero, saw the ITF group instead, at what the ITF team expected to be the final meeting before signing an observer agreement. Surprising the ITF, Balestrero also invited a representative from the Vatican Archives, Msgr. Chappin, and the Holy See’s chief negotiator for the long-delayed Vatican-Israel Fundamental Agreement, Father David Jaeger.

¶5. (C) All three men, Trauttsmandorff said, evinced considerable discomfort with the idea of ITF observer status. Balestrero argued that the Vatican needed to study the implications of the status further before committing, focusing on legalistic impediments that Parolin had already dismissed. Jaeger was hostile overall to the ITF, Porat said. She fiercely criticized his inclusion, saying he had no role to play in a discussion of the ITF’s relationship with the Vatican. XXXXXXXXXXXX Porat said that if Jaeger was so rigid about closer ties with the ITF while Austria held its rotating chair, no progress would be possible next year when Israel chairs the body. Trauttsmandorff was less harsh than his colleague but allowed the Jaeger’s involvement in the meeting was not constructive. XXXXXXXXXXXX

Connection to the Papal Archives?
———————————

¶6. (C) The three ITF visitors agreed that Chappin, who had previously been more open to dialogue with them, was very defensive at the October 13 meeting. He believed that the ITF would ask the Archives to release ahead of schedule the documents from the papacy of Pius XII, the World War II-era Pope. (Note: The Vatican releases the documents from each pontificate as a whole. End Note) DCM said that Father Norbert Hofmann, Secretary of the Vatican Commission for Religious Relations with Jews, had told her the preceding week that the files from the entire papacy would be ready for declassification in about five years. Katz thought this was far too rosy a
VATICAN 00000106 002.2 OF 002
scenario given that only six-eight researchers are now reviewing the documents. Although this number is up from the one-two working on them a year ago, he thought it was insufficient to catalog and review the 16 million documents from the Pius XII Papacy.

¶7. (C) The ITF members acknowledged their wish to gain access to the Pius XII files as soon as possible. Nevertheless, they also accepted the Vatican’s arguments, shared by DCM, that ordained clergy must review them first given the possibility that the files contain confessional documents from individual Catholics. Trauttsmandorff insisted, however, that the ITF sought a relationship with the Vatican not only to get access to the Vatican Archives, but also to work jointly with Catholic Church leaders in many countries on anti-racism and remembrance education.

Now What?
———

¶8. (C) Despite the disappointment, the ITF members were determined to find a way to move ahead with the Vatican. They concluded that they must now educate new Deputy Foreign Minister Balestrero about the ITF and its role, just as they had done with his predecessor, Parolin. They would also reach out to friends in the Vatican, such as Cardinal Kasper, to exert influence on their behalf. UK DCM indicated that HMG would also express support for ITF goals in discussions with Vatican officials, as did U.S. DCM. The team members left discouraged but committed to keep their eyes on the long-term goal.

Comment
——-

¶9. (C) Unfortunately, the ITF is only the latest group to run into problems caused by the recent change of personnel at the Vatican Foreign Ministry – others, including this embassy (ref B), have experienced similar problems on other issues. What remains to be seen is whether the ITF’s problems are the results of Msgr. Balestrero’s growing pains or caused by deeper Vatican uneasiness related to declassification of their Archives. The ITF team did not believe the Vatican was sending – via the decision to slow progress on the ITF observer status — a subtle message to Israel about the need for progress in the Fundamental Agreement talks. Time will tell. DIAZ

09ANKARA1549 2009-10-27 11:11 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara

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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TRACES HIS PROBLEMS TO ERDOGAN

REF: ANKARA 1532

Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b,d)

¶1. (C) During an October 26 call on the Ambassador, Israeli Ambassador Gabby Levy registered concern over the recent deterioration in his country’s bilateral relations with Turkey and the conviction that the relationship’s decline is attributable exclusively to Prime Minister Erdogan. Levy said Foreign Minister Davutoglu had relayed a message to him through the visiting Czech foreign minister that “things will get better.” He had also fielded messages from senior civil servants, xxxxx urging him to weather quietly Erdogan’s harsh public criticisms of Israel. The latter claimed Erdogan’s repeated angry references to the humanitarian situation in Gaza are for “domestic political consumption” only.

¶2. (C) Levy dismissed political calculation as a motivator for Erdogan’s hostility, arguing the prime minister’s party had not gained a single point in the polls from his bashing of Israel. Instead, Levy attributed Erdogan’s harshness to deep-seated emotion: “He’s a fundamentalist. He hates us religiously” and his hatred is spreading. Levy cited a perceived anti-Israeli shift in Turkish foreign policy, including the GoT’s recent elevation of its relations with Syria and its quest for observer status in the Arab League.

¶3. (C) Comment: Our discussions with contacts both inside and outside of the Turkish government on Turkey’s deteriorating relations with Israel tend to confirm Levy’s thesis that Erdogan simply hates Israel. xxxxx discusses contributing reasons for Erdogan’s tilt on Iran/Middle East isues, but antipathy towards Israel is a factor.

JEFFREY

“Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey”

09PARIS1461 2009-10-29 17:05 2010-11-29 12:12 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Paris

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NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IS TU SY FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE-ISRAEL STRATEGIC DIALOGUE COVERS TURKEY,
PEACE PROCESS, SYRIA

REF: PARIS 1418

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathy Allegrone,
Reasons 1.4(b),(d).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND: French participants in the
second annual Franco-Israeli Strategic Dialogue on October 28
noted profound disquiet among the Israelis about Turkey,
according to Frederic Bereyziat, Senior MFA Desk Officer for
Israel and the Peace Process. Bereyziat told poloff October
29 that the Israelis claimed the Turks have allowed
weapons-related material for Iran’s nuclear program to
transit Turkey, with Prime Minister Erdogan’s full knowledge.
In the lead up to this Strategic Dialogue, Bereyziat
reported, President Sarkozy called Prime Minister Netanyahu
directly on October 26, to urge him to establish an
independent investigation into the actions of the Israeli
Defense Forces in the Gaza conflict. Sarkozy told Netanyahu
that such a step would decrease pressure on Israel and its
allies stemming from the Goldstone Report, but Netanyahu
responded briskly: “No way.” Franco-Israeli discussions on
the status of the peace process stumbled over a “profound
difference on tactics,” according to Bereyziat, who also
reported the French intention to introduce a Resolution in
the U.N. General Assembly designed to prevent the Goldstone
Report from returning to the Security Council. Finally,
Bereyziat described a division within the Israeli delegation
about Syria’s openness to the west, with some on the
delegation discounting benefits that might accrue to Israel
through the re-launching of negotiations, and others
supporting the French claim that Israel would put Syria in a
bind by suddenly expressing openness to negotiations over the
Golan.

¶2. (S/NF) BACKGROUND: As notetaker for the Strategic
Dialogue, Bereyziat was in a position to provide a
description of these discussions. When serving as the
Transatlantic Diplomatic Fellow in the French MFA, poloff
often met and worked with Bereyziat. He told poloff October
29 that the Strategic Dialogue may have been his last major
meeting for the MFA, as he is leaving the ministry for
personal reasons on November 10. END SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND.

SECOND ANNUAL FRANCO-ISRAELI STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
——————————————— —

¶3. (C) Pierre Sellal, Director General of the French MFA,
and Yossi Gal, Director General of the Israeli MFA, led their
respective delegations in the second annual Franco-Israeli
Strategic Dialogue on October 29 in Paris. The “five to six
hours” of talks covered a wide range of issues, including the
peace process, Turkey, Syria, and Iran, according to
Bereyziat. The first bilateral Strategic Dialogue took place
in May 2008, approximately a year after President Sarkozy’s
election. No such exchanges took place under President
Chirac, Bereyziat acknowledged, adding that the French now
hope to make it an annual tradition. He said the next
dialogue will take place late next year. (COMMENT: This new
tradition reflects Sarkozy’s avowed attempt to create a more
balanced French approach to the Middle East by developing a
closer rapport with Israel. END COMMENT.)

TURKEY
——

¶4. (S/NF) The French participants in the Strategic Dialogue
noted profound disquiet among the Israelis about Turkey,
Bereyziat said. He reported that the Israelis claimed the
Turks have allowed weapons-related material for Iran’s
nuclear program to transit Turkey, with Prime Minister
Erdogan’s full knowledge. The French replied that Israel
would need to have clear and concrete proof of such activity
before leveling accusations. The Israelis replied that they
are collecting evidence which they will eventually publicize.
In the meantime, Bereyziat said, the Israelis explained that
they will not take strong public positions condemning what
they perceive as Turkey’s recent strategic shift away from
western positions on the peace process, Iran, and Israel’s
nuclear program. Erdogan’s public comments about Israel’s
nuclear weapons had particularly irked the Israelis,
Bereyziat explained, describing them as unprecedented by a
Turkish leader. Moreover, the Israelis blamed the Europeans,
and especially France, for this shift in Turkey’s policy.
They said that if Europe had more warmly embraced Turkey,
then the Turks would not be taking steps to earn approval in

the Arab and Muslim world at the expense of Israel. The
French, in response to this accusation, “begged to differ,”
Bereyziat said.

GOLDSTONE REPORT, PEACE PROCESS, UAV TECHNOLOGY
——————————————— —

¶5. (C/NF) President Sarkozy called Prime Minister Netanyahu
directly on October 26, Bereyziat reported, to urge him to
establish an independent investigation into the actions of
the Israeli Defense Forces in Gaza. Sarkozy informed
Netanyahu that such a step would decrease pressure on Israel
and its allies stemming from the Goldstone Report. Netanyahu
responded briskly: “No way.” French officials emphasized
Sarkozy’s point again during the Strategic Dialogue,
Bereyziat said, and the Israelis continued to reject his
advice. (See reftel for a description of earlier French
efforts to persuade the Israelis to take this step.)
Separately, to prevent the Goldstone Report from further
impeding the peace process, the French are now contemplating
a pre-emptive approach in the U.N. General Assembly,
according to Bereyziat. With this aim in mind, the GOF may
float a Resolution that would ensure the Goldstone Report
does not return to the Security Council. Bereyziat did not
specify further what this draft Resolution might contain.

¶6. (C/NF) Franco-Israeli discussions on the status of the
peace process itself resembled a “conversation of the deaf,”
Bereyziat said. “We have a profound disagreement on tactics,
but we obviously agree on the end goal.” France has not,
however, taken any “punitive” measures following the Gaza
conflict, Bereyziat explained. He said that whereas other
European countries stopped selling Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) parts to Israel after the conflict, the French have
continued to do so. And Bereyziat reported that the French
and Israelis did agree on one important point related to the
peace process: Iran continues to play a destructive role in
the region, creating and prolonging conflicts.

SYRIA
—–

¶7. (S/NF) Bereyziat described a division within the Israeli
delegation about Syria’s openness to the west. Some on the
delegation perceived Syrians as intransigent and discounted
the possible benefits that might accrue to Israel through the
re-launching of direct, or even indirect, negotiations.
Others, Bereyziat said, including military representatives
“with Ehud Barak’s ear,” supported the French claim that
Israel would put Syria in a bind by suddenly expressing
openness to negotiations over the Golan. This group of
Israelis believed Syrian leaders seek to free themselves from
dependence on Iran and to re-engage fully with the west.
RIVKIN

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